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MORAL LUCK...

 



Our everyday thinking about moral responsibility conceals a profound contradiction. Consider two individuals: Killer, who drives home drunk from a party, swerves, and kills a pedestrian, and Merely Reckless, who engages in the same conduct but happens not to strike anyone. The only difference between them is luck: there was a pedestrian in Killer’s path but none in Merely Reckless’s. Intuitively, many of us believe Killer deserves greater blame, since she brought about a foreseeable and tragic outcome, whereas Merely Reckless merely risked it. Yet we also feel that Killer and Merely Reckless should bear the same degree of censure, because luck alone distinguishes them, and moral judgment, we think, should not depend on luck. Thus, ordinary moral reflection generates a paradox: luck appears both relevant and irrelevant to moral evaluation.

This contradiction becomes even sharper if we add two further cases. Fumbles is identical to Killer and Merely Reckless in motive and disposition but accidentally loses her car keys before she can drive. Night Blind is similar in character traits, except for an unlucky impairment: her poor night vision renders driving after dark unthinkable. As a result, she never entertains driving drunk. Common sense suggests that Killer and Merely Reckless are more blameworthy than Fumbles, who at least did not drive, and that Night Blind deserves no blame whatsoever. Yet from another angle, the only differences are their circumstances and constitutions, both outside their control. If fairness requires discounting luck, then all four deserve the same degree of moral reproach.

Philosophers have proposed several responses to this tension, known as the problem of “moral luck.” The skeptical response treats luck as entirely irrelevant to moral responsibility. According to this stringent view, since luck pervades character, action, and outcomes, no one can genuinely be held responsible for anything at all. While logically consistent, this conclusion empties blame and praise of significance and forces a radical rethinking of morality, law, and interpersonal practices of holding others accountable. For most, such global skepticism counts as a Pyrrhic victory: consistent, but deeply unsatisfying.

The character response offers a subtler solution by tying responsibility solely to enduring character traits. Killer, Merely Reckless, and Fumbles, sharing the same traits, deserve equal blame, while Night Blind, lacking those traits, does not. This response resolves the paradox by disregarding circumstantial and outcome-based luck. Yet its plausibility falters once we consider cases of people acting out of character. Intuitively, we think individuals can be responsible for actions inconsistent with their normal dispositions. Moreover, the character view makes it virtually impossible to assess the blameworthiness of strangers, since their character is opaque to us, though ordinary life often requires us to do just that.

By contrast, the acts response anchors responsibility in what an individual actually does, not in traits or luck. On this view, Killer and Merely Reckless, who both drive drunk, are equally culpable; Fumbles and Night Blind, who never drove, escape comparable blame. This approach exorcises outcome-based luck but accepts circumstantial luck. Yet it appears unstable: if circumstantial luck affects responsibility for whether one acts, then, by parity of reasoning, outcome luck might just as legitimately affect responsibility for what those actions bring about. The acts response risks collapsing back into the very paradox it sought to dispel.

Finally, the moral luck response embraces the role of luck directly. Outcome, circumstance, and constitution legitimately shape moral responsibility. Hence Killer deserves more blame than Merely Reckless because she caused a death; Merely Reckless more than Fumbles because she actually drove drunk; and Fumbles more than Night Blind because she at least attempted to drive. This view captures our reflective intuitions most closely, but it also explains why we feel conflicted. We implicitly conflate two distinct dimensions of moral evaluation: being a bad person (a matter of character and volitional tendencies) and being blameworthy for specific events (a matter of outcomes and actualized actions). Recognizing this distinction dissolves the appearance of paradox.

Seen in this light, Killer and Merely Reckless may be equally bad persons, since their dispositions are identical, yet Killer is more blameworthy in event-responsibility because of the fatal outcome. Likewise, Fumbles is no better or worse in character than the other two, though she is less blameworthy in action; Night Blind, with her limiting impairment, differs even in character. Works Tonight, another potential analogue who skipped the party due to work obligations, underscores the same point: equally bad character, but no blame for that night’s actions. Once we distinguish responsibility for character from responsibility for outcomes, the paradox evaporates, even if lingering discomfort reminds us how pervasive luck is in moral life.

Philosophical puzzles aside, the lesson extends beyond blame allocation. The problem of moral luck undermines the conceit of moral pride—the belief that we are fully self-made and thus wholly responsible for our virtues. In reality, our moral standing reflects not only conscious choices but also accidents of upbringing, circumstance, and constitution. This recognition does not eliminate moral responsibility but tempers it with humility and compassion: a reminder that, with different fortune, any of us might have erred in similar or even worse ways.

WORDS TO BE NOTED-                                                                                                                    

  1. Contradiction – a situation in which two claims or ideas cannot both be true.

  2. Foreseeable – able to be anticipated or predicted in advance.

  3. Censure – strong disapproval or formal criticism.

  4. Paradox – a situation that involves seemingly self-contradictory yet connected ideas.

  5. Disposition – a person’s inherent qualities of mind and character.

  6. Skeptical – inclined to doubt or question accepted ideas.

  7. Pyrrhic victory – a victory that comes at too high a cost to be worthwhile.

  8. Plausibility – seeming reasonable or believable.

  9. Opaque – not transparent or difficult to understand.

  10. Circumstantial – dependent on external conditions or surrounding details.

  11. Unstable – lacking firmness or consistency; prone to change or collapse.

  12. Conflate – to merge or blur two distinct ideas into one.

  13. Disposition – a person’s tendency or natural attitude.

  14. Analogous – comparable in certain respects; similar in function.

  15. Humility – a modest view of one’s importance; absence of arrogance.

Paragraph Summaries

Paragraph 1:
Introduces the problem of moral luck through the cases of Killer and Merely Reckless, highlighting the paradox: Killer causes harm while Reckless does not, though both act identically. We feel both that Killer deserves more blame and that this difference is unfair because it is due only to luck.

Paragraph 2:
The paradox intensifies with Fumbles, who never drives due to bad luck, and Night Blind, who cannot drive because of her condition. Intuitions again conflict: we assign different levels of blame, yet fairness suggests all should be equally blameworthy since differences stem only from circumstance or constitution.

Paragraph 3:
Philosophical responses are considered. The skeptical response denies moral responsibility altogether by excluding luck from evaluation, but this radical stance undermines meaningful practices of blame, praise, and law.

Paragraph 4:
The character response measures responsibility by traits, not outcomes. This avoids outcome luck but fails because people can act uncharacteristically, and strangers’ character is not easily knowable, making the approach impractical.

Paragraph 5:
The acts response ties blame to actual deeds, not character. While it discounts outcome luck, it remains unstable, since if luck in circumstances counts, outcome luck should as well, reintroducing the paradox.

Paragraph 6:
The moral luck response accepts that luck matters in outcomes, actions, and character. By separating blame for actions/events from judgment of moral character, it dissolves the paradox. The passage concludes by extracting a moral lesson: since luck profoundly shapes our lives, we should temper pride with humility and compassion.

SOURCE-   AEON ESSAYS

WORDS COUNT-  600

F.K SCORE- 16



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