APPROACHES OF ETHICS ON MORALITY 

Many academic disciplines purport to investigate the nature of morality, yet it is arguably the philosophical subfield of normative ethics that approaches this inquiry in the least mediated or alienated manner. Rather than confining their attention to the sociological or psychological phenomena of how individuals and cultures conceptualize and articulate moral norms, normative ethicists strive to discern which actions or states of affairs are, in themselves, morally praiseworthy or blameworthy, and to elucidate the underlying reasons for such evaluations. In contrast, the philosophical sub-discipline of meta-ethics adopts a characteristically ‘meta-’ perspective, interrogating the very possibility and nature of normative ethical inquiry. Meta-ethicists ask whether there exist objectively correct answers to questions of right and wrong, or whether moral discourse is ultimately illusory or reducible to subjective opinion.                                                                                                                                

 Over the past decade, my scholarly endeavors have been situated primarily within the domain of meta-ethics. I maintain the conviction that there are substantive truths regarding what is morally right and wrong, and that some of these truths possess an objective, or as the literature terms it, ‘stance-independent’ character. In other words, the moral wrongness of torture does not derive from the fact that I, or we collectively, disapprove of it; rather, torture is wrong because, quite simply, it inflicts profound suffering. Furthermore, I contend that these objective moral truths are, in principle, knowable, and that certain individuals possess a greater aptitude for discerning them—individuals who might aptly be described as ‘moral experts.’                                                                                                                      

 Nonetheless, this perspective is far from universally accepted. Some critics conflate the notion of objectivity with concepts such as cultural universality, innateness, or the reducibility of moral truths to a handful of exceptionless principles. Such conceptual confusions often precipitate an outright rejection of moral objectivity. Beyond these misunderstandings, however, there exist more intellectually sophisticated objections. Certain skeptics resist the idea of objective moral truths on the grounds that morality, if it is to be objective, must be grounded in some foundational basis—a basis which, they argue, is conspicuously lacking. Others, more sympathetic to moral objectivism, endeavor to construct such a foundation, seeking an ultimate justificatory ground upon which the edifice of morality might securely rest.                                                                                                                                            

 In my estimation, both of these approaches are fundamentally misconceived. Morality is indeed objective, yet it neither requires nor admits of any external foundation. Rather, I argue that morality enjoys a kind of epistemic autonomy: it is self-sustaining and does not depend on any non-moral justificatory ground. The evaluative domain—including morality—functions as a complex web or network of interrelated values, each element explicable in terms of others, but the totality persisting as a brute fact. Admittedly, this conception may initially appear peculiar or even dismissible; it is, after all, counterintuitive to conceive of morality as “floating,” unsupported by any foundational structure   myself once found this view perplexing and difficult to accept.                                                      

 To clarify what is meant by a “foundation” in this context, it is instructive to consider whether a moral theory such as utilitarianism might serve as such a foundation. Utilitarianism asserts that actions are morally right insofar as they promote overall wellbeing; thus, charitable giving is right because it increases wellbeing, while gratuitous violence is wrong because it does not. This theoretical framework offers a comprehensive account of moral phenomena. Nevertheless, utilitarianism does not, in my view, constitute a foundation in the relevant philosophical sense. This is not due to any deficiency inherent in utilitarianism as a moral theory, but rather because it remains, fundamentally, within the domain of moral discourse.                                                                                                                                       

 A foundation, properly conceived in philosophical terms, would be something that undergirds or justifies moral theories and claims without itself being implicated in moral reasoning. To illustrate, consider the classic objection advanced by moral skeptics, following David Hume, who contend that one cannot logically derive an “ought” from an “is.” If one were to rebut this skepticism simply by affirming the truth of utilitarianism—claiming that one can infer moral obligations from the promotion of wellbeing—the skeptic would likely find this response unsatisfactory. The skeptic’s challenge is to step outside the moral discourse altogether and supply a non-moral foundation: a justification that is not itself rooted in the evaluative realm of “ought.” In my view, the demand for such a foundation is misguided, for morality’s objectivity does not depend upon, nor can it be secured by, external justificatory grounds.                                                                                                                            

WORDS TO BE NOTED -

1. Purport
   Meaning: To claim or profess (often without proof); to appear or assert.
   

2. Mediated
   Meaning: Indirect; involving an intermediary or secondary influence.
   

3. Elucidate
   Meaning: To clarify or explain thoroughly.
   

4. Stance-independent
   Meaning: Objective; existing independently of subjective opinions or cultural perspectives.
   

5. Conflate
   Meaning: To mistakenly blend distinct ideas into one.
   

6. Precipitate
   Meaning: To trigger or cause abruptly.
   

7. Epistemic autonomy
   Meaning: Self-sustaining knowledge; independence from external justification.
   

8. Brute fact
   Meaning: A fundamental, unexplained reality; something accepted without deeper justification.
   

9. Counterintuitive
   Meaning: Contrary to common-sense expectations.
   

10. Undergirds
    Meaning: To strengthen or support from beneath; to provide a basis for.
    

11. Justificatory
    Meaning: Providing reasoned support or validation.
    

12. Reducible
    Meaning: Capable of being simplified into basic components.
    

13. Gratuitous
    Meaning: Unjustified; lacking reason or purpose.
    

14. Explicable
    Meaning: Capable of being explained or understood.
    

PARA SUMMARY- 

Many fields study morality, but normative ethics focuses on what is actually right or wrong, while meta-ethics asks if there are real, objective answers to moral questions. The author believes that some moral truths, like torture being wrong, are objective and can be known, even if not everyone agrees. Some people think morality needs a solid foundation, but the author argues that morality stands on its own and doesn’t need outside support. Instead, morality is like a network of connected values that exist as basic facts, even if this idea feels strange or hard to accept at first.

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WORDS COUNT- 550

F.K SCORE - 16